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Abstract
Free/Libre and Open Source Software projects (FOSS) are a form of Internetbased commons. Since
1968, when Garrett Hardin published his famous article “Tragedy of the Commons” in the journal
Science, there has been significant interest in understanding how to manage commons appropriately,
particularly in environmental fields. An important distinction between natural resource commons and
FOSS commons is that the “tragedy” to be avoided in natural resources is overharvesting and the
potential destruction of the resource. In FOSS commons the “tragedy” to be avoided is project
abandonment and a “dead” project. Institutions – defined as informal norms, more formalized rules,
and governance structures – are mechanisms that have been shown to help overcome tragedies in some
environmental commons situations. The goal of this paper is to more formally describe the concept of
FOSS institutions and to conduct a preliminary examination of FOSS projects in order to shed light into
institutions, their composition and importance to the projects. We report findings from an initial set of
interviews of FOSS developers and find that in commons settings that need to encourage contribution
rather than control overappropriation, the institutional designs appear to be extremely lean and as
unobtrusive as possible. To the FOSS programmers we interviewed, institutional structure adds
transaction costs and hinders collective action. This is markedly different from traditional
environmental commons settings.
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Introduction
Much of the early literature related to Free/Libre and Open Source Software (FOSS) describes
projects as teams of selforganized volunteers collaborating over the Internet to develop a software
product. In recent years, however, we have witnessed a serious commitment by private firms, non
profit agencies and government agencies to embrace FOSS as an information technology strategy or
policy (Hann, 2002; Myung, 2005; Becker, 2005; Peruvian Association of Free Software, 2005;
Goldman and Gabriel, 2005). In some cases, notforprofit foundations have been or are being
established to provide financial support to FOSS projects and to provide some assurance that the
software will be maintained and supported over time (see, for example,
http://www.mozilla.org/foundation/). One could make the argument that, as a collaborative
development paradigm, FOSS is maturing.
As more organizations become vested in FOSS, a central question will be how to increase the
likelihood that these collaborations result in a “successful” product. As Steven Weber remarked (2004:
267): “one of the next steps in research on open source should be to build analytic models that try and
specify the conditions that favor or hinder these experiments.” We have argued elsewhere (Schweik,
2005) that to understand what leads to success or failure of FOSS projects one needs to look at a
project's (1) physical attributes (e.g., type of programming languages used, communication and library
management infrastructure, etc.), (2) community attributes (e.g., degree of user involvement, leadership
characteristics, social capital, etc.), and (3) institutional design. The phrase “institutional design,” as
we use it, describes the informal norms and more formalized rules and governance structures that
organize FOSS social interaction (Singleton, 1998; Nie and Ingram, 1998; Dietz,et al., 2003; Ostrom,
2005).
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While there has been considerable research on FOSS in recent years, with some of it analyzing
the physical or community aspects of projects, very little research exists that explicitly studies the third
category: the structure or evolution of FOSS institutional designs.1 Focusing on FOSS institutional
designs draws attention to some FOSS questions that are currently not well understood: What do FOSS
institutions look like? How important are they to the success or failure of a project? Are FOSS
institutions more informal or formal? Are there some commonalities across FOSS projects in
institutional structure? How do FOSS institutions evolve from project startup to project “death”?
The goal of this paper is to more formally describe the concept of FOSS institutions and to
conduct a preliminary examination of FOSS projects in order to shed light into institutions, their
composition and importance to the projects. This paper is part of a longerterm project study a large
number of FOSS projects looking for key factors that lead to success or tragedy in FOSS projects, and
to understand project evolution over time (Schweik, 2005).

A Starting Point: The Tragedy of the FOSS Commons?
The phrase “collective action” in the social sciences describes situations where the efforts of
more than one person are required to achieve a desired outcome (Sandler, 2004). A large proportion of
FOSS projects found on hosting sites like Sourceforge.net – arguably the largest repository of FOSS
projects – involve only one developer (Krishnamurthy, 2002). As Table 1 shows, as of April 2005,
more than 90 percent of the projects listed on Sourceforge.net still involve less than five developers. By
definition, projects with one developer could not be classified as collective action (assuming no one
else is contributing to documentation or testing. Teams of 24 developers could be considered collective
action situations, but they do not pose very difficult coordination problems, so they are not ideal
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subjects for collective action research. While the statistics in Table 1 show that collaborations with a
team size of five or more people are relatively small in number when compared to the total number of
FOSS projects that exist, there are still a substantial number of FOSS projects that fall into these
collective action, or in some cases global collective action, categories.

Table 1: Numbers of FOSS projects in Sourceforge.net organized by
development team size (April, 25, 2005)
Source: FLOSSmole (2005)
Greater than 25 developers

224

Between 11 and 25 developers

1573

Between 5 and 10 developers

5532

Between 1 and 4 developers

86,373

Total number of FOSS projects on
Sourceforge as of April, 2005

93,702

Collective action situations are usually connected to the creation or maintenance of public
goods. Two characteristics define a public good: nonrivalry and nonexcludability (Ostrom and
Ostrom, 1977). Nonrivalry means that the use of the good by one individual does not reduce the
amount of the good available for others to use. Nonexcludability means that it is difficult to prevent
people from utilizing the good. FOSS licensed software in digital form served on the Internet possess
these properties. However, while FOSS can be considered a global public good, there are designated
owners of the software (established, for example, through the copyright statements in the FOSS license,
in comments of the code or on a project website) who act as gatekeepers to determine what can or
cannot go into the project's next release. Viewed as a system of production, FOSS projects have been
referred to as a “commons” (Bollier, 2002; Goldman and Gabriel, 2005), but, to be more precise, they
are a “common property regime” (Schweik, 2005). (In this paper, we use “commons” and “common
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property regime” as synonyms, and for readability we will use “commons”).
There is a wide and rich literature on environmental commons (e.g., forests, fisheries, water
systems) (See National Research Council, 2002 or Dietz et al., 2003 for summaries), and it is well
understood that people involved in these situations face obstacles to social cooperation (Ostrom, 1990;
Singleton, 1998; Ostrom et al., 1999; Dietz et al., 2003). A key problem of the commons is that
individuals who cannot be excluded from the benefits of a good often have little incentive to contribute
voluntarily toward the production or maintenance of that good – what are commonly referred to as
“freeriders” (Olson, 1965; Sandler, 2004). In forest, fishery or water settings, the freerider problem
can lead to overappropriation of the resource – the “Tragedy of the Commons” problem (Hardin,
1968).
FOSS commons, however, being digital, are distinctly and fundamentally different from
environmental commons in that the potential tragedy is not one that results from overappropriation of
the resource (the software). In fact, the idea of a FOSS software being “overharvested” – lots of people
utilizing the software – would be considered a good thing, in that it would be gaining market share. So,
if overappropriation is not a problem, is there a potential tragedy of the commons in a FOSS context?
Undoubtedly yes. Freeriders in this context are programmers, testers or documenters who utilize a
particular FOSS software but do not contribute back in these capacities. In a FOSS setting, the tragedy
of the commons comes when there are insufficient human resources available to continue to further
develop and maintain the software and, as a result, the software project becomes abandoned (Schweik,
2005). The project fails to achieve the functionality and use that was perhaps envisioned when it began.
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Three Important Attributes of FOSS Commons

In order to study FOSS institutions and their influence on the success or failure of projects,
there are three important attributes that need to be considered: (1) Evolutionary Stage of the Project, (2)
Development Team Size, and (3) Measures of Success or Tragedy. Short descriptions of each follow.
Evolutionary Stage of the Project. In earlier papers (Schweik and Semenov, 2003; Schweik,
2005) we noted that FOSS projects go through two stages, Initiation and Growth. We define the
Initiation Stage as the initial period of time a project goes through where people are collaborating on
software code but there has yet to be a public release of this code. We define the Growth Stage as the
period after the first public release. Obviously, any empirical study of FOSS projects will find projects
in each of these two stages. We suspect that the variables that influence success or failure (tragedy) in
FOSS projects differ in these two stages.
Developer Team Size. Projects will also differ in the number of developers they have associated
with the project (as shown in Table 1). From an institutional design standpoint, we expect FOSS
projects with larger numbers of people collaborating to have more complex institutional designs. In
addition, it is likely that the different developer team sizes in Table 1 probably reflect different stages of
growth of the project. That is, many of the very large projects, in terms of developers, probably went
through earlier periods where they had much smaller development teams. For this reason, we think
studying these midrange group sizes may be informative in terms of how FOSS projects evolve and
grow larger.
Measures of Success or Failure. Research already exists that has worked to identify measures of
success or failure of FOSS projects (Stewart and Ammeter 2002, Crowston, et al., 2003; Capiluppi et
al., 2003). Building on these efforts, we think that measures of success or failure of FOSS commons
7

probably depend upon what evolutionary stage they are in. This means there are four possible
outcomes: Initiation Stage success or failure and Growth Stage success and failure.
We define Success in the Initiation Stage as “a project producing a first public release.” This can
be easily measured by seeing if the project has produced a first release of the code.
As we see it, Failure in the Initiation Stage occurs when a project has not been able to produce a
first release within the first year of the project being public. Preliminary data we have analyzed from
Sourceforge.net indicates that projects over a year old that have not had a release are generally
abandoned. This is easily measured since most project sites or hosting sites, like Sourceforge.net,
provide information on when the project was started and when the first release was launched.
Abandonment can be measured by (1) no code “commits” or changes in lines of code in the concurrent
versioning system (CVS) or other repository over the course of a year, or (2) little or no activity on
developer email lists and forums over the course of a year. An often repeated saying about FOSS
culture is “release early and often.” Therefore, a one year timetable for this measure seems sufficient.
(This was also supported in some of our FOSS developer interviews, described later).
We define a project as Successful in the Growth Stage if the project has produced “several
releases of a software product that performs a useful computing task for at least a few users (it has to be
downloaded and used).” The measure of “subsequent releases” is fairly easy to get for projects because
this is stored on most project hosting websites. Measuring “a useful computing task” is harder and a bit
more subjective. Acquiring the number of downloads recorded on project websites is probably the
easiest measure, since this too is recorded on most project hosting sites. Other more time consuming
measures to generate, include: (1) a content analysis of user forums or email archives on utility of the
software; (2) an actual download, installation and use (for some software); or (3) interviews with users
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who have downloaded the product. The final parameter of this definition, “a few users” is also
measured by the number of downloads.
Finally, we define Failure in the Growth Stage to be when a project appears abandoned (very
few downloads, little development activity, such as code commits, going on, etc.) without achieving
several subsequent releases.
We recognize that there will be some projects that will not easily fit into these categories. For
example, an Indeterminate in the Initiation Stage project might be one that has yet to produce a first
public release but shows significant developer activity. Indeterminate in the Growth Stage might be a
project that shows development activity but has not yet produced several releases. Nonetheless, having
a measurable definition of success and tragedy for various stages that can be operationalized for most
projects is an important component for this and our broader FOSS research.
Institutions and Avoiding the Tragedy of the Commons
Institutions – informal norms, more formalized rules, and governance structures – are
mechanisms that have been shown to help overcome tragedies in some environmental commons
situations (Ostrom 1990; Ostrom et al., 1999; Dietz et al., 2003). For example, in her seminal book
Governing the Commons, Elinor Ostrom3 (1990) provides cases where local resource users have created
their own selfgoverning systems which overcome freerider problems and the overharvesting situation
that are the result of this behavior. Ostrom has emphasized in her work over the years that this
collective development of institutions to govern natural resource commons is by no means easy. It takes
hard work, to the point where she often refers to the local users as “artisans” who “craft” institutions.
While the institutional designs across cases certainly vary, many evolve from initial interactions that
establish trust and social capital, to the establishment of acceptable norms of behavior, to the
9

establishment of more formalized rules coupled with monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms for rule
breakers (Ostrom, et al., 1999).
So, how might this work in a FOSS commons setting? Let us first adapt an example of informal
relationship or norm building by Nee and Ingram (1998:25) and place it in a FOSS context. Suppose
Dana, a software developer, establishes a new FOSS project, places it on SourceForge.net and invites
others to participate. Suppose John comes along, who is interested in the project, as a developer or
user, or both. John might send a number of emails to Dana about particular problems he is having
with the software, or other questions related to learning how to contribute to the project. Dana answers
these questions using time that could have been spent on other work. John reciprocates by bestowing
on Dana a higher level of social approval. Both parties are rewarded by this exchange of assistance for
approval. In addition, John is learning, and Dana is perhaps hoping that John might eventually help
advance the software or at least help to promote it. Their exchange builds on mutual understanding and
expectations that may be initially unspoken. Even if John is dependent on Dana's help, he does not want
to give the impression of being “stupid” to Dana or to others who may be working on the project. Dana
may expect John to eventually reciprocate by at least following informal norms of conduct and by
providing some new code or enhancements to old code. She may also expect John to view and consider
her as his “superior,” at least in that she is the designated owner of the code. Nee and Ingram (1998:25)
note that “[s]uch an implicit contract, an informal norm, may sooner or later be expressed in some
communication in statements of expected behavior. Violation of the norm leads to such forms of
punishment as anger or refusal to continue the interaction.” For example, a common norm that can be
violated (particularly by “newbies”) in computing related issues is the norm often used in text
messaging or email shorthand: RTM (Read the Manual) or, in more anger, RTFM. If John continued to
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ignore this norm and ask questions, this could lead Dana to terminate the relationship.
The above probably describes many FOSS collaborations, particularly ones in early stages and
ones that are allvolunteer in nature. These informal norms that begin to be established are important
because they reduce uncertainty in human interactions and help solve coordination problems, especially
when a project reaches a situation where specialization and divisions of labor emerge (Nee and Ingram,
1998). And in cases where FOSS projects grow in terms of numbers of participants, or in cases where
firms or government agencies contribute resources to the effort, we expect that these sets of informal
norms will develop or evolve. For example, as the size of the development team increases, coordination
norms, conventions or even decrees might develop and evolve to help the team coordinate their
activities and solve coordination problems that may reoccur (UllmannMargalit, 1977).
Other FOSS researchers have noted the potential importance of institutions in FOSS projects.
Crowston (2005) referred to these as “shared understandings” as he discussed the next steps of the
broad, global FOSS research agenda. Goldman and Gabriel (2005: 232) state: “...every opensource
project has some sort of governance because decisions must be made all the time” and suggest that the
institutional structures get more complicated when firms become involved. They also suggest that
governance and institutional designs change as the project evolves over time (Ibid., p. 233). And Weber
(2004: 189) noted the importance of an institutional perspective when he said: “The open source
process is an ongoing experiment. It is testing an imperfect mix of leadership, informal coordination
mechanisms, implicit and explicit norms, along with some formal governance structures that are
evolving and doing so at a rate that has been sufficient to hold surprisingly complex systems together.”
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General “Levels” of Institutions that may exist in FOSS projects
(Note: when we use the term “rules” in this section, we are referring to both unwritten social
norms and more formalized, documented rules.)
Studies of the institutional design of natural resource commons have focused on three
institutional “levels” (Ostrom et al., 1994; Ostrom, 2005; Schweik, 2005). The first level, the
“Operationallevel”, is a general name for rules that influence the everyday decisions and actions made
by project participants. In a FOSS setting, these are the norms or rules that specify how the further
development and support of the software may proceed. The type of FOSS license used and the
collaborative platform used for version control (e.g., CVS, subversion) establish some operationallevel
rules.
The second institutional level, “CollectiveChoice,” (Ostrom et al., 1994) is the generic name for
two types of rules. The first type defines who is eligible to undertake certain operationallevel
activities. For example, in most projects there is probably some kind of norm or rule that specifies who
has authority to promote or “commit” some code to the “next release” library. In some projects, this
authority might be highly centralized; in other projects, the authority might be quite distributed,
allowing each developer to promote their code when they feel it is ready. The other type of collective
choice rules specifies who can change operationallevel rules and the procedure to follow to make such
a change. For instance, as more developers join a project, there may be a need to change the
operationallevel rule on how code is reviewed before being promoted. Collectivechoice rules would
determine how a new operational procedure would be agreed upon and changed.
Constitutionallevel rules are the third tier of institutions. Constitutionallevel rules specify who
is allowed to change collectivechoice rules and the procedures for making such changes. One example
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in a FOSS setting might be when the recognized leader of a project decides to move on to a new
opportunity. Constitutionallevel rules might specify who takes over in this person's absence. Another
example is the case where a FOSS project operating entirely by volunteer developers becomes
“embraced” by a commercial firm. This entry by a firm may (or may not) change who is involved in
collectivechoice processes.

The Negative Effects of Institutions?
Given the discussion above, it is likely that institutional configurations in FOSS commons will
evolve as teams get larger and, at least in some cases, help the project avoid collective action problems.
But Raymond (1999), a famous proponent of open source, raises an interesting puzzle regarding the
freerider problem in FOSS and the role institutions play in them:
“The real freerider problems in opensource software are more a function of friction
costs [our emphasis] in submitting patches than anything else. A potential
contributor with little stake in the cultural reputation game may, in the absence of
money compensation, think ``It's not worth submitting this fix because I'll have to
clean up the patch, write a ChangeLog entry, and sign the FSF assignment papers...''.
It's for this reason that the number of contributors (and, at second order, the success
of) projects is strongly and inversely correlated with the number of hoops [our
emphasis] each project makes a user go through to contribute.”
Inferred in Raymond's statement is an understanding of the kinds of people who participate in
FOSS development. We can classify FOSS developers into four types:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

relatively inexperienced volunteer programmers;
inexperienced paid (by a firm, nonprofit or government agency) developers;
experienced, highly skilled paid developers; and,
experienced and highly skilled volunteer developers;

For the first category of developers, volunteer and relatively inexperienced programmers,
research has shown that there are strong motivators for participating in a FOSS development project,
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with two of the primary motivations being economic: skill building and signaling. Inexperienced
volunteer programmers often participate in FOSS projects in order to build their own skills through the
reading and writing of code and by being subjected to the peerreview process. Through this
participation, they hope to show off their skills, make connections and build a reputation with, in part,
the hope of gaining future economic opportunities (Feller and Fitzgerald, 2001; Schweik and Semenov,
2003; Lerner and Tirole, 2005).
For the second and third categories of programmers – paid programmers – a primary motivation
is obvious: they are doing what they are asked by their employer who pays them.
But the category of programmers Raymond refers to in the above quote falls in the fourth
category in our list above: highly skilled, volunteer programmers who have little need or desire to
further skillbuild or signal their abilities to others. There is some evidence that in FOSS this fourth
group of participants may be particularly important. For example, two studies of larger FOSS projects,
Linux (Dempsey, et. al., 2002) and the GNOME desktop environment (Koch and Schneider, 2002),
found that a smaller set of “core” developers contributed a majority of the code to these projects.4 Ye
and colleagues (2003) describe a situation where development of GIMP (the Gnu Image Manipulation
Program), ceased for some time because there was no developer community to pick up the work when
the initial developers decided to move on.
Consequently, Raymond is saying that the key freerider problem in FOSS settings is how to get
and keep highly skilled volunteer programmers to contribute their time and resources to the project.
And the reference to the “number of hoops” in Raymond's quote suggests that the existence of too many
established rules and procedures related to the operation of a project might be a factor that drives
developers away.
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Raymond's claims are supported by the work of O'Mahony (2003), which reports that FOSS
developers resist centrally controlled governance and formal methods for organizing. And Holck and
Jorgensen (2005: 2) summarize this nicely in their recent paper on “control” versus “anarchy” in FOSS
projects: “developers would prefer loosely controlled projects with a flat hierarchy, relying on
individual autonomy, tacit norms, and selforganization rather than commands, control, and explicit
rules.”
An Initial Empirical Study of FOSS Institutions
The above discussion leads to an interesting puzzle. On the one hand, there exists a rich
literature on environmental commons situations that suggests that institutions – norms, rules, and
governance structures developed by the participants themselves – are key to solving problems of
collective action. Moreover, as Holck and Jorgensen (2005:2) report, traditional software development
settings have relied on “diligent project management” including planning, directing and controlling the
process. But on the other hand, studies of FOSS collaboration suggest that too much control,
governance or other systems of organization might cause participants to stop collaborating, leading to
project abandonment  the tragedy of the FOSS commons. That is, to use Raymond's phrasing,
institutions could create “friction” that leads to a collapse of collective action in FOSS settings.
This leads us to three fundamental research questions and three initial hypotheses:
Research Questions:
RQ1. What kinds of institutional configurations exist in FOSS projects?
RQ2. How do they evolve?
RQ3. What kinds of configurations appear to help, or hinder FOSS projects?
And at this juncture, we have three general hypotheses related to FOSS institutions:
Hypothesis 1: FOSS projects in the initiation stage (Figure 1) and/or involving a small number
15

of developers, will have institutional designs that are lean and informal. There may also be
some sort of loose or informal, but understood, decisionmaking or governance structure
established.
Hypothesis 2: FOSS projects will move incrementally from informal norms to more formalized
rules and governance structures as more developers join the project.
Hypothesis 3: Projects with larger numbers of developers on their team and that are farther in
the development lifecycle (the growth stage of Figure 1) will exhibit more formalized
institutional structure than smaller projects, but there will be an effort to minimize the number
of formalized rules and procedures so as to not alienate project members.
Research Methods
Given that we think that institutions evolve over time and this evolution is related to the number
of developers on the project, we wanted to investigate cases that represent the four different ”Number of
Developer” categories presented in Table 2.

Table 2. FOSS PROJECT SAMPLING STRATEGY
Number of Developers
Stage

<5

>=5 and <=10

>10 and <=25

>25

Initiation

Cases 1,2

Case 4

Difficult to find

Difficult to find

Growth

Case 3

Case 5

Cases 6, 7

Cases 8,9

For this initial study, we limited ourselves to selecting two cases from each “number of
developers” category for a total of eight cases. We had an opportunity to interview a developer from a
third “less than 5 developer” project, which added one more case in that category (Table 2).
Two of the projects we studied were identified through personal connections with FOSS
developers. Both of these were small development projects, falling in the “less than 5 developers”
category. To identify two cases in the three other “number of developers” categories in Table 2, we
utilized the FOSSMole (2005) data on Sourceforge.net projects to generate a case sampling database.
16

We eliminated projects with duplicate project names or with the number of developers field empty or
set to zero. We then queried the database and organized the 93,702 projects left into four categories
(presented earlier in Table 1). We utilized this database to randomly select cases to study, stratified by
the number of developers, which is an attribute in the Sourceforge project metadata. We sent emails
out to lead developers, asking them to be interviewed and then followed up on positive responses. The
developers we interviewed represented projects from various FOSS software categories including:
operating system components, content management platforms, web server and applications, utility
programs, a Usenet news application, an instant messaging application and a Geographic Information
System application. As noted in Table 2, identifying cases where there were larger groups of
developers (e.g., > 10) and which were also in the Initiation Stage (as defined by not yet having a
public release of the code) was difficult.
Since collective action is easier in small groups, we hypothesize that most projects tend to start
small and grow in the number of participants as the software code base becomes larger and more
complex (Sandler, 2004). The fact that it is difficult to find projects with greater then ten developers in
the initiation phase lends credibility to this hypothesis.
We developed an interview protocol as part of the larger FOSS study outlined in Schweik
(2005). This protocol consists of questions that cover (1) the history of the project; (2) ways to
conceptualize success and failure in the project; (3) attributes about the software being developed; (4)
collaborative infrastructure used; (5) attributes about the developers contributing to the project; and (6)
general information about the institutional design of the project – the focus of this paper. In these
interviews we did not specifically ask about the various categories of rules (e.g., boundary rules, scope
rules, etc.) described earlier, but limited our questioning to the daytoday operations of the project
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(Operational rules, above). We also asked questions about who has authority to change those
operational level rules (“CollectiveChoice” arrangements, above) and asked whether there were higher
level governance rules on, for example, how leaders or others in positions of authority in the project are
replaced or whether a formal constitution for the project existed (Constitutionallevel rules, above). The
structured interview consists of about sixty questions in total and takes fortyfive minutes to an hour to
complete. Interviews were conducted over the phone, and several of our cases involved people working
outside of the United States. Each interview was recorded using a digital voice recorder then
transcribed and analyzed using Transana, an open source software for qualitative analysis. Transana
allowed us to attach keywords to passages in the transcripts and group responses by question or by
keyword. Finally, and importantly, several of the developers we talked to have worked on more than
one FOSS project, so many of their answers reflected more projects than just the nine we report on in
Table 2.
Results
Although the surveys we conducted covered aspects of open source collaboration beyond
institutions, for this paper we will limit ourselves to the institutional aspect of the projects. Areas of
discussion included: (1) operationallevel rules in place; (2) how rule systems are learned by new
participants; (3) how they handle rule breaking; (4) how conflict is dealt with; and (5) collectivechoice
and constitutional level aspects.
Operationallevel rules. In our interviews, we first asked interviewees to describe the important
operational rules in place for their project. Several interviewees from the three smallest projects (less
than 5 developers) reacted initially by saying “we have no operational rules” or something similar.
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Further discussion revealed there were some procedures in place, but, other than the
requirements of the FOSS license, not many had been formalized. For example, related to an
operational rule about modularity of code, one interviewee of a small project said: “if you send [one of
the lead developers] a large patch... he'll outright reject it. He'll tell you to cut it up in 6 or 8 pieces so
he can understand it completely before going on to the next piece.” But what operational rules these
small projects had in place were clearly few, and very informal in nature.
Similarly, the two projects we studied with between 5 and 10 developers also reported very few
operational level rules, but the respondents did report having informal rules established to help
coordinate the work effort. Like the smaller projects, these rules were not formally documented. As one
respondent put it: “Some operationallevel rules are documented in the project forum, but others are
just common sense.”
As we move to the next project size category – development communities with between 10 and
25 developers, the degree to which operational rules have been considered changes, as does the
informal or formal nature of those rules. For example, in one project, an interviewee who was the
designated project lead said this:
“The important operational rules are...that, ... with some help from my project
manager, [we] maintain the list of people who are allowed to make changes to the
code. They're expected not to make changes that will be controversial without first
discussing them with the development team, usually via our development mailing list.
Those people have access to managing our bug reporting system as do some other
people. All of them are expected to act professional, in a respectful manner, towards
users, even when a user seems to not be very reasonable, or aware of what's going on.
Really, it's sort of mostly a trust based system, it's worked very well with a few minor
exceptions, which have been taken care of by saying to the person: `look, you need to
not do this again, or you're not gonna be allowed to continue to contribute.'”
Similarly, an interviewee in the other project in this category reported a move from informal to
more formal procedures because of coordination problems that had occurred in the past:
19

“It's a consensus model, a nonwritten agreement how to work [together]..., and this
is something [that is] partially written down for [the process of] releases. Those
[exist] because we have had problems in the past where some steps were missing, so
we had to redo the release, which is, of course, something unfortunate.”
Finally, one of the two projects with more than 25 developers reported mostly informal
operational level rules understood by most participants, coupled with some documented rules or project
guidelines (such as standards for writing code) on the project Wiki. When we, for clarification, repeated
our understanding of this to the interviewer, and he responded by saying:
“That's right. Remarkable that it still works, isn't it?”
The second project with more than 25 developers reported the most extensive formal
documentation of operationallevel rules. For this project, substantial documentation exists on the
project website, including documents that explain how people can participate in code development,
testing, writing documentation, etc. Other documents describe the project's coding standards or how to
implement “secure code”, and there exists a developer's guide and handbook. Finally, written
documentation describes how to avoid the situation of creating too many modules that are similar in
nature that causes, in their words, “confusion, clutter and inefficiency.” But with this formally written
library of documents established, an interviewee on the project responded: “Basically the operational
rules are pretty simple. It's read the documentation, [find the component] you want to work on, and if
you've got questions you have the mailing list available.”
How are rules learned? When we asked interviewees of all project sizes how new participants
learn operational rules, very similar responses were given: They learn the rules by watching the
discussion in project forums (usually email lists), getting a sense from the observation on how to
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proceed and perhaps having someone on the existing team explain things to them. Then they go ahead,
and learn by doing. Three of the four larger projects noted that someone on the team helps guide new
developers or that new developers are instructed to read documentation written to help new developers
join in.
Rule breaking. We followed this discussion with a question about what happens if an operational
rule is broken by a team member and whether any formal procedure is in place to handle rulebreakers.
For example, in environmental commons it has been shown that a system of “graduated sanctions”
helps deal with rulebreaking situations (Ostrom, 1990, Dietz, Ostrom and Stern, 2003). Eight of the
nine projects we reviewed had no system in place to handle rule breaking. Small projects had really
never run into a situation where they needed to handle this problem. One of the participants in a larger
project put it this way:
“The closest thing to breaking a rule would be checking in broken or poor code. It is
handled very graciously and not in an accusatory way. It's not like a public berating or
anything.”
Another said:
“[This is handled] either oneonone [between the project lead or someone of
authority and the rule breaker] or via the list. But a very cooperative situation. Small
hand slap and that's it.”
However, an interviewee of one of the largest projects was a little tougher:
“People call them out. You know, you get flamed on the mailing list. That's generally
how it happens.”
Conflict management. Having established some kind of conflict resolution mechanism has also
been seen in environmental commons situations as something important. In our interviews, we asked
respondents whether they had witnessed conflicts and whether there were any rules or procedures for
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resolving such conflicts. In the three smallest projects this was not even seen as an issue worth
discussing. In all other cases (projects greater than 5 developers all the way up to the projects with
greater than 25 developers), conflicts were usually resolved through discussions over the project
forums, with most being resolved through consensus. In one large case the interviewer said: it is “rarely
the case where two people are at the same level of competence for a problem and they have completely
different opinions.”
In a few cases the lead developer needed to talk to one of the participants separately to help
resolve the problem. And three of the four largest projects reported having past situations where a
conflict resolved through consensus led to the person whose idea wasn't taken leaving the project. Two
of these led to efforts to “fork” the project (take the code and start a new project using that code).
However, in neither case was it reported that this fork was successful.
Collectivechoice and Constitutionallevel rules. Earlier, we introduced two other levels of rules:
CollectiveChoice and Constitutional. Recall that CollectiveChoice rules define who is eligible to
undertake certain operationallevel activities (e.g., the governance hierarchy) and also specify who can
change operationallevel rules and the procedure to follow to make such a change. Constitutionallevel
rules specify who is allowed to change collectivechoice rules and the procedure for making those
changes. Interviewees were asked questions related to these concepts.
In the projects with developer teams of 10 or fewer people, the governance structure or hierarchy
was very flat. Most projects (including our largest project of over 25 people) had one developer who
was seen as the lead and had the authority to work with the next release library, and everyone else
worked with or considered themselves “reporting into” that lead developer, even if such a hierarchy was
not formally defined. The other four projects we interviewed with teams of 10 or more developers,
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exhibited slightly more structure. One of the projects between 10 and 25 developers reported a flat
hierarchical structure but had a designated lead developer and a “project manager” to help coordinate
the effort. In the other case in this category, the lead developer was seen as a kind of generalist, with
others on the team being more specialists of certain components of the project. These people were
assigned to different components by their capabilities and expertise, and certain people could prove
themselves very competent and gain informal authority. This describes the kind of “meritocracy” that is
often referenced in literature about open source projects.
The other project with more than 25 people had a designated project lead, with several sub
leaders of various major components of the project. After these leadership positions, however, most
other developers were generally considered the same level, although some had more skills or knowledge
than others. As our interviewee put it:
“There is [sic] definitely people whose job it is to project manage, to make sure projects
are getting done... but... basically every developer out there is to some extent a project
manager... we have people in welldefined roles and more responsibility than others for
sure, but in general its not like the hierarchical tree of management. It's not like we have
worker bees and then bosses.”
To our surprise, the other project with over 25 developers reported a very informal hierarchy.
People on the project know who is the authority on the project for various components, but, as this
respondent put it, there is no “explicit identification of individual roles that have been outlined or
publicly demonstrated on the web...” This case also raised an interesting issue regarding project
management and the role of developers paid to work on a project by a company with some interest in
the project. In this case, the project's name actually referenced the company in it, so the tie between the
software and the company was clear. Further, several of the project participants were employees of the
interested company, including our interviewee, who referred to himself as a “key architect” on the
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project. What this respondent found interesting, however, was that often other project participants were
confused about the actual authority or influence the company had on the project, regardless of the
company’s explicit relationship. The respondent said frankly that the project wasn't hugely important to
the company, but wanted it to keep going. In short, our interviewee summarized it this way:
“When a company sponsors an open source project they need to realize that people are
going to perceive [that the company is]... far more involved in [the project] than it might
actually be.
Regarding the question of how operationallevel rules are changed, we found that in most of the
projects, large or small, the person seen as the project lead had most of the authority. It was only in the
larger projects where respondents reported that a team discussion was needed before any major
operating rule was changed. For instance, in one of the largest projects, the interviewee noted that
“operational rules [change or are added] when something is not getting done that is
needed to be done, and someone takes up the responsibility to do it.”
We concluded our questions on the institutional design of these FOSS projects by asking
interviewees about the constitutional level: Who can change the process in which operational rules are
crafted? Who has the authority to do this? A good example of what we mean by this might be the
existence of a “board of directors” in a nonprofit organization since board of directors have some
authority over the lead of a project and how they manage or change operations. We also asked to what
extent contractual arrangements were in place on the project. Given what we heard about the
CollectiveChoice level rules, we were not surprised to hear that most projects had very few, if any,
formal constitutional level rules in place. Even in the large projects, for example, there were no formal
procedures on how one would be chosen to replace someone of authority who was leaving the project.
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In this example, most cases reported that there would be probably a logical choice based on merit and
expertise, perhaps coupled with some public discussion in the forums.
Two of the larger projects, one in the greater than 10 category and the other in the greater than
25 category, reported a more complex situation with regard to their working relationship with nonprofit
organizations. The largest project worked closely with both a nonprofit and a private company, both
using and promoting the core software. The nonprofit is just putting in place a governing board, and the
private company is owned by the employees. So, while constitutionallevel rule systems were not really
in place, the respondent thought in the future some might eventually be there based on these
relationships.
One other interviewee working with a project in the greater than 10 developer but less than 25
category, reported that in the past year his project had “joined” in a kind of federation of FOSS projects
working toward a broader and mutually reinforcing goal. The result was the establishment of a
foundation that acts as an umbrella organization for eight or more related, but separate FOSS projects.
This foundation has an oversight board and is imposing a few rules on related projects, should they
want to be considered part of this “federation” (our term, not theirs). One requirement for membership
is that each associated project must have a steering committee in place. According to our interviewee,
there is very little interest by project participants to meet this requirement. They prefer the informal
mode of operations, with no formal committee or governing body. This is an issue they are still dealing
with, and it is not clear what the result will be.

Discussion
Earlier we presented some research questions and some initial hypotheses related to the
institutional designs of FOSS commons. The analysis above of nine FOSS projects with differing
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“developer size classes” leads to several preliminary conclusions that tend to support our hypotheses:
FOSS institutions appear to evolve, as expected. Projects with smaller sized development teams
and earlier in their lifecycle tend to have very lean institutional components and operate through
informal systems and rules.
As projects gain developers, they continue to exhibit fairly lean sets of operational level rules.
And many of the operationallevel rules that exist are in part established by the collaborative platform
the team uses to coordinate their work (such as the Concurrent Versioning System (CVS) that is used by
many FOSS development projects). This differs significantly from environmental commons, for in the
environmental domain, there are not usually Internetbased technologies that are used to coordinate
collective action. This finding raises an interesting question: To what degree does the design of the
versioning system and other technologies influence or change the way a FOSS team collaborates? Does
system design affect the performance of the team? Literature on virtual teams suggests that
collaborative infrastructure is an important factor (Gibson and Cohen, 2003; Kelly and Jones, 2001;
Dube and Pare, 2001). And our finding that many operationallevel rules actually are embedded within
the collaborative platform suggests this to be true in FOSS as well. However, in our interviews we were
generally told that the versioning system really didn't contribute much to the success or failure of the
project. We also learned that a wide variety of technologies (e.g., email listservs, Internet Relay Chats,
bug tracker applications) were used across projects to coordinate work. So it appears to be still an open
question as to the influence of collaborative tools on project success or failure.
There was more attention to Constitutional and Collective choice processes in the larger
developer communities (>10 developers) compared to the smaller communities (<10 developers). But
again, in all projects these sets of rules were also mostly informal mechanisms and were relatively thin.
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And this leads us to perhaps most important conclusion: Institutional designs across all
development team sizes appear to be kept as lean as possible. Our analysis here supports the statement
by Raymond about keeping “friction costs” to coordination low. This is a relatively stark distinction
between FOSS commons and the more traditionally studied environmental commons. We think this
difference is best explained by the fundamental difference in the type of “tragedy” that could occur:
overharvesting in the environmental case, compared to underproduction in the FOSS development
case. In a commons that needs to encourage contributions rather than control overappropriation,
institutional designs need to be in place to help coordinate collective action, but need to be as
unobtrusive as possible. We kept hearing the desire of participants to code and not get caught up in
coordination costs that formal rule systems bring with them. Part of this might be attributed to a
“culture” in FOSS, but our impression from our interviews is that the formal structure is simply not
needed. To these programmers, structure adds transaction costs and hinders collective action.

Conclusion
In this paper we have emphasized a number of points. First, while the vast majority of FOSS
projects involve very small teams or even one individual, as of April 2005, in the SourceForge
repository alone, there were over 1700 projects with eleven or more developers (Table 1). And given
this is data from only one (although arguably the largest) FOSS hosting site, this likely underestimates
the number of FOSS projects with relatively large development teams.
Second, we no longer think of FOSS development projects as being comprised entirely of
volunteer collaborators. Firms, nonprofit organizations and/or government agencies pay some FOSS
developers.

Three of the projects in our small sample had some level of participation by at least one of
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these types of organizations.
Third, we emphasized that FOSS software projects are an Internetbased “commons” or more
precisely, a “common property regime” working to produce a public good. FOSS software have
designated owners (via copyright) and these projects have gatekeepers who can rightfully keep people
out of participating in development.
Fourth, we noted that there is a wide and rich literature studying commons situations, much of it
studying commons in natural resources, and much of the attention has been on problems related to
collective action.
Fifth, we noted that a key difference between environmental commons and FOSS commons is
the kind of “tragedy of the commons” they face. In environmental settings it is overharvesting of the
resource. In FOSS commons, the tragedy is an underproduction or maintenance problem.
Sixth, we noted that it is wellknown in environmental commons that institutional designs –
norms, formal rules and governance structures – often help to overcome commons tragedies. We noted
that some FOSS research suggested that too much governance structure and rules to the collaboration
may get in the way of FOSS collaborations.
Seventh, we argued that there isn't a great deal known about FOSS project institutions or how
they evolve over time.
The rest of the paper set out to investigate FOSS institutional structure and get a sense of their
evolution by analyzing a small number of FOSS projects. We studied nine projects, stratified by
developer team size.
Perhaps the most important finding of this study is that the rules and governance structures
established in these projects were mostly informal (meaning articulated in the form of social norms, and
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not formally documented) and the organizational structures are quite flat. This was especially true in
the smaller (group size) projects. The four larger projects (greater than 10 developers) exhibited a bit
more formality in operational rules and governance structures, but in all cases they tried to keep these
systems as simple and lean as possible. In many cases, the operational rules that existed were largely
driven by the collaborative platform they used to coordinate their activities. This lack of formal
institutions, particularly in the larger projects, was a bit of a surprise to us given the importance of
institutions in natural resource commons settings and is an interesting finding to students studying
commons and collective action issues. The very different “tragedies” in natural resource commons
compared to FOSS commons – overappropriation in the former, underproduction in the latter – is
probably a key reason for this finding. In environmental commons, institutions (including monitoring
and sanctioning mechanisms) are required to force people to comply (e.g., not freeride) in an effort to
avoid overuse of natural resources. In FOSS settings, institutions and formal governance appear to be
viewed as a barrier to free creativity and innovation.
Another interesting finding was that the projects of different size classes did exhibit the
institutional change patterns we expected – moving from very simple norms of behavior to more
complex (but often still relatively informal) structures – as we moved from studying small groups to
large ones. This suggests that one way to understand the trajectory of FOSS projects might be to study
different size classes rather than having to search through (perhaps nonexistent) historical records of
one particular project or to locate and interview participants who may have long gone.
But clearly, results from this small set of FOSS cases is not generalizable. Working in
collaboration with the FLOSSMole project, we are in the process of developing a larger database of
FOSS cases (from Sourceforge.net as well as other hosting sites) where we will be able to do an
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extensive online survey and eventually quantitative analyses that get at, in part, FOSS institutional
structure and change. The work we present here on institutional aspects (and other information gleaned
from these initial interviews on physical and community aspects of these projects) is helping us develop
a general theory of success and failure of FOSS projects which can then be tested in the next stage of
our study.
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Endnotes
1. This is not to say that there is no work looking at FOSS institutional components. See for
example, Van Wendel de Joode et al. (2003). And Holck and Jorgensen's (2005) study Mozilla
and FreeBSD provides an excellent description of institutional components of these projects.
2. We should note that another trajectory or set of trajectories we do not list here are the cases
where commercial, “closed source” software is relicensed by a firm or organization that
developed it as FOSS. In these instances, the FOSS project might start out with a significant
amount of code and maybe a first release. The number of developers associated with the project
could be very few, or many, depending on if the firm decides to continue to pay staff to support
the code. For this paper, we will not focus on this type of case, but we recognize that it exists.
3. For readers who may be unfamiliar with Elinor Ostrom's work – she is one of the premier social
science scholars who has devoted a lifetime to studying how humans organize in collective
action and commons settings – mostly (but not entirely) in environmental management settings.
4. Sandler (2005) refers to these situations as “weighted sum aggregation”, where some people
contribute more than others toward the production of public goods.
5. This project is part of a larger project studying factors that lead to success and failure of FOSS
projects. The study of FOSS institutions is one component – albeit an important one – of this
study. See Schweik (2005) for more information.

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons AttributionNonCommercial–Derivs 2.5 License
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/byncnd/2.5/).
33

